Betting Situations

After studying up on the rules and the strategies, a player will sit down at a table - either live or online - and play his or her first hand. What happens next may vary widely according to the cards drawn by the player and the others, but the scenarios can sort out into a number of familiar situations. Here are some of them.

What information does a bet convey?

When someone bets, it does not necessarily mean that the player thinks that his (or her) hand might be the best at the table. It certainly can mean that, and often does. But it can also mean that the player thinks that the opponents' hands might be poor ones, and if confronted with the decision to call or to fold, they will fold. In short, "bet" can mean either "I'm strong" or "You're weak." It does not have to convey both messages.

There is no rule of any poker game that requires a person to bet in either the "I'm strong" situation or in the "You're weak" situation. But it would be a mistake not to bet when one of those declarations would be appropriate.

Likewise, no rule of poker prevents a person from betting when neither the "I'm strong" nor the "You're weak" proposition fits the facts. But it would equally be a mistake not to fold when both of those declarations would be inappropriate.

Seasoned players do not often make either mistake. New players often think it is bluffing or just plain clever to keep the opposition off balance with frequent betting that violates the "I'm strong" or "You're weak" principles. In truth, it is just a dumb mistake. Seasoned players will pick up on it very quickly. The only justification for straying from this simple principle is the occasional weird bet, made as an investment in disrupting patterned or predictable play. It is not an attempt to win a pot, but simply a contribution to a longer-term strategy of keeping the opposition guessing. For example, it is sometimes good to be caught bluffing when it doesn't cost very much, as it will permit a later pot to get richer when you do have strong cards and want to bet aggressively. But such moves are a departures from correct practice for justifiable, tactical purposes. They are not mistakes. They are exceptions.

Larceny of Antes and Blinds

A few times in any good poker session, a player will be sitting "on the button" on the first round of betting. No one in front has opened, so it's up to that person, in the dealer's position, to do one of three things: (1) call the big blind, (2) raise the big blind, or (3) fold. (In Stud games, the opportunity is not necessarily on the button, but rather in the late positions to the right of the person with the lowest door card (highest door card in Razz). That position makes the "bring-in" bet, which is a form of blind bet).

If, in such a situation, the player chooses to stay in the game (rejecting folding) and decides to raise the big blind (rejecting mere calling), then the other players might accuse the player of "blind-stealing." Why? If this well-positioned player had folded, the small blind could have folded, too (at the loss of half a bet), and the big blind would take the pot, which contains one bet from the big blind and a half-bet from the small blind. The net result: small blind loses one-half a bet to the big blind. Nothing more. Alternatively, the small blind could have checked and the big blind could have checked. The game would go on.

Now, if this well-positioned player had merely called, then the small blind still could have folded at the cost of half a bet, or stayed in the game for a completed bet, and the big blind would be fully paid. So two or three players in late position would go on to the next round. However, by raising, the player (1) forces the small blind to fold unless the hand is worth another 1½ bets, and (2) forces the big blind to fold unless the hand is worth another full bet. If neither player has a hand that justifies such action, then they will both fold, and the player takes the 1½ bets in the pot.

This is called "stealing" because (1) none of the money in the pot came from the person who takes it, and (2) it is very tempting in this position to raise without the cards to justify it (i.e., bluff), in hopes that the small blind and the big blind will walk away.

As a player in this position, do not feel as if poker etiquette frowns on "stealing the blinds." It is almost an entitlement of the person on the button. If it takes place, it means that no one at the table (except possibly you, but who knows?) had cards worth playing. It is a favor to everyone to get that deal over with and to start a new one in which people will have another opportunity to play a real hand of poker. In essence, it amounts to a cancellation of an uninteresting deal. The fact that money flows to the right (rather than being returned) is just a minor injustice that no one really worries about, particularly since the button rotates.

Check-Raises

A check-raise is permitted in modern poker, though in older times it was forbidden. (The old rule was that unless someone raised after you, you did not have a chance to bet again in the same round.) The idea is to check first, when betting comes around to you, in order to lure others in later position to come into the pot. Then, when one or more of them calls and the turn continues around, you raise them. The check creates the impression of not having a strong or pat hand (otherwise there would be a raise). They might think that perhaps you hold a draw hand, and want to keep the price low for seeing the next card. Then, once the other players are lulled into this secure feeling about your hand, you pounce with a raise! Against weaker players the check-raise functions well, as they will probably call your raise -- more out of stubbornness or momentum than out of an analytical judgment that their cards merit such financial support in the face of your more aggressive play. Either way, the pot is now larger - for the benefit of a player with a strong hand going into the next round.

Larceny Through Raises

A so-called "steal raise" is the act of raising the pot when seated in last position. If all players had called or checked to you, and you are last to act, a check (or call, if required) would simply lead to the next round - the dealing of one or more cards and some more betting. BUT, if you, in last position, raise the pot, it prevents the play from going to the next round. The betting stays on this round.

This tactic creates one of two possible outcomes: (1) First, as betting continues, more players are likely to fold. This is because you have suddenly made it more expensive to see the next card. This reduces the competition in the later rounds, and may be an excellent tactical move for a player with a middling hand (or a good draw hand) - one with possibilities for greatness, but maybe not against a full table. (2) Second, it is possible that all players will fold, and you will take the pot at this point. This is why it is called a "steal raise." This latter tactic might be tried every so often without actually having the cards that would justify a raise. It would be a bluff.

The steal raise position is ideal for bluffing - but maybe only once. Good players will catch on quickly if a weaker player tries the tactic too often without the cards to back it up. They will "check to the raiser," meaning that they will pay the raise just to force the bluffer into (perhaps) an expensive corner on the next level.

Opening Raise

An opening raise or "opener" is a raise from the first person to act at the table. The big blind bet or "bring-in" bet is on the table, and the person in earliest position must act. Of the three alternatives available to such a player (fold, call or raise), it is most common for them either to fold (with unplayable cards) or call (with cards worth playing). Raises are rare because no one else at the table has yet made any moves, and the action is taken totally in the dark.

When the first player to act raises right out of the box, it should mean, "My cards are really great!" But that does not make much sense. By raising, the player is forcing the others to call two bets at once. A really good hand will usually be slow-played in an early round to try to lure more people into the pot, not chase them away. So the hand is probably not all that strong.

Now, if a player has a weaker hand, he or she might want to discourage people from entering the pot at an early stage of the proceedings, and this is what the opening raise accomplishes. For this reason, an opening raise almost always spells "bad hand" to the seasoned player -- a bluff or at best a semi-bluff. Some players think of this tactic as a "preemptive steal-raise" - defending by attacking first.

Surely an opening raise will chase players away. Those who stay in the game, however, are either equally aggressive with so-so cards, or they have a strong hand. Their betting reactions will not help the opening raiser one bit, as they could simply call. So the players move into the next round of betting, and the opening raiser is still potentially in the dark as to whether it was a winning tactic, or whether he (or she) is just a lamb leading itself to the slaughter. Even though some call this move "betting for information," the only information received is who will jump out of the game. Those who stay do not have to divulge much at all. The tactic is best employed with few players, in hopes that everyone will fold and the person in first position simply steals the blinds (and/or antes) by a preemptive strike.

Putting on the Squeeze

Suppose you are in a game with relatively few players and you have a strong hand. The odds of prevailing are high. The problem is that one or two other players may be hanging in there with decent draw hands. They will try to get to see the next card for sure, unless the pot odds fail to justify it. So, instead of slow-playing a strong hand in the early stages, you bet it. When there are not many players in the pot, by betting, you raise the pot and also the price to stay in the pot. The pot odds might move favorably to a draw player, but not quite enough to justify staying in the game. If there were $40 already in the pot, but only two players in the game, a bet of $10 would create pot odds to the "squeezeor" of 4:1. The "squeezeee" is looking at 5:1 pot odds, not quite good enough to bet to see a flop with just flush or straight possibilities (in the 9:1 odds ranges). The "squeezeee" should fold.

Special Considerations in No Limit and Pot Limit

Squeezing. When playing limit games, often it is not practical to squeeze another player. You can bet the max or raise the max and still the pot odds will favor your opponent's decision to stay in for the next draw - the flop or whatever. In other words, limit poker sometimes frustrates a player with a pat hand because he or she can not get the price of staying in the game to be so high as to squeeze out the draw players. Then they stay in and maybe win. In pot limit and no limit games, this is less of a problem, as the maximum bet or raise can be equal to (or sometimes even greater than) the pot. If, for example, post-flop, a pat player wants the pot odds to flatten out - go from, say, 5:1 down to 2:1, he or she just bets the pot. That automatically puts at least a 2:1 proposition in front of the next player, who might be looking to fill a four-flush or four to a straight. The chances of filling out a flush in the last two cards are 34.9%. The chances of filling out a straight in the last two cards are 31.45%. If the flush player has already called, (meaning that now the pot odds to him or her are exactly 2:1 (or 33.33%)), then hanging on for the fifth suited card just barely makes sense. If the flush player had not yet called when the squeeze bet was made, then the pot odds would be flatter than 2:1, and the flush player should fold. Either way, for the straight draw, staying in the game at this point has a negative expectation. In the previous example, assuming limit poker rules, a player could not flatten the pot odds from 4:1 down to 2:1, starting with $40 already bet (unless some unusual assumptions were made about stakes and spread limit rules).

Causing Negative Expectation Calls. The idea of betting to squeeze the pot odds for opponents with draw hands is often not to chase them away, but rather to lure them into a negative call. A bet that puts the pot odds just slightly negative for the opponent with a draw hand may generate good profits - more than a bet that forces them to fold.

Assumptions about Draw Hands. Seasoned players often simply assume that the opponent has a draw hand, and that it's to a flush. This is the most common draw hand and also the one with the highest chance of making it (almost 35% with a four flush at the flop). The other draw hands would require yet higher pot odds. Under the best of circumstances, four to an outside straight has about a 31% chance of making it post-flop. Turning a pocket pair into a set is around an 8% chance, and so on. So the "paradigm" draw hand is the four flush. This simplifies a bit the calculation of bets.

Assume two players survive pre-flop in $2/$4 No Limit Hold'em: One has pocket kings, both black. The flop is AH-QH-4S. The pot stands at $200. Both players have comfortably large stacks, say $2000 or so each. The player with the pocket kings goes first. Now the thinking is that if his opponent bets aggressively, it could mean that she has an ace in the hole, or that she's looking for a fifth heart. Or possibly both. How much to bet?

Well, if the possibility of a pocket ace were not in the picture, the idea would be to bet so much as to make the pot odds disfavor a flush draw on the turn. That would be about 35%. Betting $200 (the amount of the pot) makes the pot odds to the opponent equal to 2:1 - not enough. $250 would make it 1.8:1 at 35.7%. This is "enough" but not by much. A $300 bet puts the pot odds to the opponent of 5:3 or 37.5%. To force players out of a game on a flush draw, more is often required than a couple of percentage points. At a $400 bet, the pot odds are 3:2 (40%), and she should be aware that she's underwater (if she is).

If the opponent raises, it probably means that she has made a mistake. Realistically, the best she can have is the other ace, for a high pair. Conceivably she has a pocket pair of aces or queens, but that probability is very remote (under 2%). She could also have an ace and a queen for two pair, or two pair with fours. Any of these combinations is improbable. However, to prevail with the pocket pair of kings against any of these hands (other than a set of aces), it would be necessary to complete a set of three kings on the turn or river. The odds of that are about 8.5%. If the opponent's raise is small relative to the pot, it might make sense to call her raise (if the pot odds coming back the other way are around 11:1, which they could be). If the opponent's raise were simply a mistake or an attempt at a bluff, calling it would, of course be the right response.

If, on the other hand, the opponent really has no ace or queen, but rather two miscellaneous hearts, her only possible winner would be a flush. For her to call the bet would have been a goof in such a case, much less raising. But stranger things have happened.

Note that in this example, the opponent can not have both an ace and two hearts in the pocket.

If the opponent folds, it means that she did not have the ace, and decided not to bluff. It would be stupid to look for the fifth card in the flush at a price that is not compensated by the right amount of reward for the risk taken. If instead she was looking for a straight or some even less likely draw, the decision was just that much more sensible.

If the opponent just calls the squeeze bet, it could mean that she has the ace or that she's prepared to make a slightly negative bet out of curiosity to see the turn card.

When the turn card comes, assume it is not a heart. For the betting round going to the river, the flush draw now has less than a 20% chance of success (9 outs divided by 46 cards gives 19.6%). It should not be hard to lever up the pot odds against this 4:1 probability. If she hangs in there and calls again, she might win with a flush, but the last two bets were negative expectation bets, and in the long run, this opponent will cough up all her chips.

Sometimes the idea is not to lure an opponent into a bad bet by calling when he or she has the worst of it. Sometimes the idea is to chase the opponent away from the game altogether. For that purpose, it is usually important to know how big the opponent's stack is relative to the pot. The thinking is as follows: "If I bet a little more than one-third of my opponent's stack now on the turn, she will understand that I intend to bet the remainder of her stack on the river. She will think, if I go for it and lose, I'm busted." This should more than scare away a half-way prudent player from the bet.

Ceilings in Pot Limit. In Pot Limit games one can never flatten the pot odds to less than 2:1, by definition. That's less than the odds of making a flush in two cards and just slightly worse than the chance of making an outside straight in two cards. In Pot Limit a person might bet the pot simply to prevent a player from calling in order to see the next card. On the turn, making the flush has a 19% chance of success. A player may realize that if he or she doesn't make the hand then, there will be another Pot Limit raise to make calling the same bet on the river (at 20%) just as bad a deal.